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Summary
During'the 1960's, the United States X-15 rocket-
plane research program successfully demonstrated
the ability to support a reusable vehicle operating
in a near-space environment. The similarity of the
proposed HL-20 lifting body concept in general size,
weight, and subsystem composition to that of the
X-15 provided an opportunity for a comparison of the
predicted support manpower and turnaround times
with those experienced in the X-15 program. Infor-
mation was drawn from both reports and discussions
with X-15 program personnel to develop comparative
operations and support data. Based on the assump-
tion of comparability between the two systems, the
predicted staffing levels, skill mix, and refurbishment
times of an operational HL-20 appear to be similar
to those experienced by the X-15 for ground sup-
port. However, safety, environmental, and support
requirements have changed such that the HL-20 will
face a different operating environment than existed at
Edwards during the 1950's and 1960's. Today's op-
erational standards may impose additional require-
ments on the HL-20 that will add to the maintenance
and support burden estimate based on the X-15
analogy.
Introduction
The X-15 rocket-plane program is arguably one of
the most successful flight research programs to date.
Conceived in the early 1950's, this rocket powered
aircraft began flight testing in the late 1950's and
concluded in 1968 after 199 flights. The flights were
staged from a B-52 aircraft that was used to carry
it to launch altitude. The X-15 set speed and alti-
tude marks yet to be surpassed by any other aircraft.
While much of the focus of the program was on the
scientific and engineering discoveries that increased
our knowledge of high-speed aeronautics and tech-
nology, the processes needed to support space flight
of later reusable spacecraft were being developed by
those responsible for servicing the X-15. A number of
papers have been written that address the X-15 op-
erational processing (Hoey and Day 1962; Love and
Palmer 1961; Love and Young 1965, 1966, and 1967;
Row and Fischel 1963). However, detailed informa-
tion about specific support operations such as the
maintenance crew size and skill mix was not gen-
erally covered by these reports. The source of that
information is retained, primarily, in the memories of
those who were a part of the X-15 program. Some of
the support methods developed during the program
appear to be the basis for techniques still in use in
the Space Shuttle program.
The HL-20 represents a recent study of a lifting
body concept designed to complement the Shuttle
as a means to support Space Station crew rotations
on an operational basis (Piland 1990). Required
to be launched into orbit by an expendable launch
vehicle, the HL-20 would itself be reusable and
require a maintenance program to prepare it for
reflight. Contracted studies with Rockwell Inter-
national Corporation (Ehrlich 1991) and later by
Lockheed Advanced Development Company (Per-
sonal Launch System Feasibility Study under NASA
Contract NAS1-18570) further defined the initial
NASA concept in terms of subsystem requirements
and provided initial estimates of the manpower and
processing times required based on aircraft and air-
line maintenance concepts. From these estimates a
comparison can be drawn between the X-15 and the
HL-20 concept to assess the potential support re-
quirements of this new system.
The proposed HL-20 design has many similarities
to the X-15 (figs. 1 and 2, table I). They are similar
in size and weight, they are both staged off of launch
vehicles, they both consist of a fleet of 3 aircraft, and
they have similar subsystem types, including reac-
tion control, avionics, thermal protection, etc. The
flight program for the X-15 lasted over 9 years and
included 199 flights. The HL-20 flight program is
anticipated to include 143 flights over a 20-year pe-
riod. Over the life of the X-15 program, the average
turnaround time for this research aircraft was 44 cal-
endar days, including mission and delay times (de-
rived from Miller 1983, see appendix). Turnaround
time for the HL-20 is predicted to be 46 calendar
days, including a 3-day mission.
This paper presents a comparison of the predicted
support requirements for the HL-20 with the histor-
ical support requirements of the X-15 in terms of
manpower and turnaround time. The X-15 require-
ments were established by drawing from past reports
and from interviews with those with firsthand main-
tenance and support operations experience on the
vehicle.
Nomenclature
ac
ACC
AFRSI
Ag-Zn
APU
alternating current
advanced carbon carbon
advanced flexible reusable surface
insulation
silver zinc
auxiliary power unit
Length, ff ........ 50
Span, ff ......... 22
Dry weight, lb ..... 15000
Gross weight, lb...33 300
±
A&P
BITE
CO2
dc
ECLSS
GN&C
GSE
HTP
HUD
KSC
LiOH
LOX
MMH
NDE
N204
OMS
RCS
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airframe and powerplant
built-in test equipment
carbon dioxide
direct current
environmental control and life
support system
guidance, navigation, and control
ground support equipment
-- =
high-temperature performance
head-up display
Kennedy Space Center
lithium hydroxide
liquid oxygen
monomethyl hydrazine
nondestructive evaluation
nitrogen tetroxide
orbital maneuvering system
reaction control system
Figure 1. X-15.
STS
TPS
TVC
space transportation system
thermal protection system
thrust vector control
ProcesSing Descriptions
X-15 Turnaround Process
Turnaround timeis cm:_idered the length of time
from the completion of one flight to the completion
of the next flight, including ground processing and
mission time. The refurbishment or maintenance
time, which is a subset of the turnaround time, is
measured from the time the vehicle returns from
flight to when it is ready for the next flight (Love and
Young 1967). Refurbishment time is dependent on
the ma{n{enance, instrumentation, and modification
requirements; the flight schedule; and the size of
the support crew. During th_ mid-1960's the X-15
program was achieving a flight rate of over 30 per
year for the 3-aircraft fleet. According to discussions
with Charles N. Baker, former X-15 crew chief at the
Dryden Flight Research Facility, in this time period
the support crew for each aircraft typically consisted
of 12 technicians per shift, 2 shifts per day, 5 days
per week. (In the last 2 years of the program, when
the flight rate was reduced, a single support crew
Body length, ft
Span, ft
Dry weight, Ib
Gross weight, Ib
Rockwell
design
29.5
23.5
19 501
27915
Lockheed
design
29.5
23.5
19170
25486
©
Figure 2. HL-20 lifting body general arrangement.
of 12 would work the second shift and would focus
its work on the next flight vehicle.) Ample overtime
was available when required. The crew skills mix was
typically that of an inspector and one electrical, four
mechanical, four avionics, and two propellant/engine
technicians. Other skills, such as guidance specialist,
could be called upon for preflight operations.
Launch operations usually required two shifts,
with the mating operations of the X-15 to the
B-52 taking place the day before launch on second
shift. Activities for launch would usually begin about
3:00 a.m. on the day of a flight, with fueling and
checkout to support a 7:30 a.m. B-52 takeoff and a
9:00 a.m. launch. These activities usually required
the full 12-person X-15 support crew plus an addi-
tional 4 to 5 propellant/engine specialists, and a 3-
person crew for the launch aircraft.
Upon completion of the mission, the same crew
that prepared the X-15 for launch usually deserviced
and safed the aircraft and removed instrumentation
in preparation for return to the hangar. Frequently
this could be accomplished before the second-shift
operations. For emergency landings of the X-15 at
alternate dry lake beds, return to Edwards could take
up to 3 days with a flatbed trailer.
During 1965 it required 134 civil service people to
operate the fleet of X-15 aircraft (Love and Young
1967). This represented fairly mature operations,
with 177 flights completed by the end of this year.
The average turnaround for 1965 was 31 calendar
days, with some flights having been turned around
in as little as 8 days (Love and Young 1967). The
72 maintenance technicians (24 technicians per air-
craft for the fleet) working the vehicle maintenance
program were supported by the remaining 62 non-
maintenance staff. Although the functions performed
by the nonmaintenance staff were not defined by
Love, they are believed to have consisted of engineer-
ing, quality assurance, process planning, simulation,
shop support, training aircraft support, and an ad-
ministrative staff of unknown size (based on a discus-
sion with Jack Kolf, former X-15 project engineer at
Dryden Flight Research Facility). In addition there
were 79 people performing mission analysis functions,
which included flight planning, mission monitoring
and tracking, and data analysis. This annual sup-
port manpower of 213 for the X-15 aircraft provides
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Table I. X-15 and HL-20 Subsystems for Rockwell and Lockheed Designs
Parameter
Body--primary
Body--upper panels
Fins/wings
Heat shield structure
TPS--bottom
TPS upper
TPS leading edges
Landing gear
Main propulsion
RCS propulsion
OMS propulsion
Prime power
Electrical
Actuators
Avionics
'ECLSS
Personnel accommodations
Recovery/abort
X-15
Titanium and Inconel X
structure, Inconel X skin
Inconel X skin
Titanium and Inconel X
structure, Inconel X skin
Inconel X
Ablative, resin-based glass
bead powder (limited
use/X-15A-2)
Ablative, resin-based glass
bead powder (limited
use/X-15A-2)
Ablative
Nonsteerable nose wheel (2),
main gear skids
Anhydrous ammonia/LOX,
helium purge
Hydrogen peroxide, 12 nozzles,
40 to 100 lbf
None
2 APU's driven by hydrogen
peroxide for electrical
and hydraulics
HL-20 Rockwell
Hydraulic
Aluminum 2219/2024
Aluminum alloy honeycomb
Graphite polyimide
(with TPS)
Graphite polyimide
HTP6 (direct bond)
AFRSI blanket (direct bond)
Advanced carbon carbon
All electric fighter gear
None
Hydrogen peroxide
Hydrogen peroxide/JP-4
Rechargeable Ag-Zn batteries
HL-20 Lockheed
Aluminum 2219/2024
Aluminum alloyhoneycomb
Titanium honeycomb
(with TPS)
Titanium isogrid (segmented)
HTP6 (direct bond)
AFRSI blanket (direct bond)
Advanced carbon carbon
All electric fighter gear
(F-5 modified)
None
MMH/N204 (satellite vernier
thrusters)
MMH/N204 (STS RCS vernier
thrusters)
Rechargeable Ag-Zn batteries
115 volt ac dc dc
Electromechanical
State-of-the-art and advanced
systems
Liquid nitrogen for temperature
control of suit, cockpit, and
instrumentation
Full pressure suit
Electromechanical/
electrohydraulic
Ejection seat
State of the art
(autonomous/BITE/
HUD/etc.)
Water loop; solid amine CO2
removal system
Apollo-type waste
management
Apollo-type chutes, solid abort
motors
State of the art
(autonomous/BITE/
HUD/etc.), eliminate micro-
wave landing system
a basis for comparison with HL-20 spacecraft sup-
LiOH canisters, ammonia
boiler, water loop
Apollo-type waste
management
Apollo-type chutes/solid abort
motors with TVC
tenance process, and the integration and launch
port requirements. In addition to the 213 people process. The refurbishment time and manpower
providing direct support, the X-15 program required are assumed to be driven primarily by the mainte-
112 people to support the B-52 carrier aircraft, over- nance requirements for the vehicle_ in the Rockwell
haul tim XLR99 rocket engine, and provide base sup-
port, bringing the total annual manpower require-
ments to support the X-15 program to 325 people.
HL-20 Turnaround Process
The HL-20 refurbishment process is made up
of the sating and deservicing process, the main-
HL-20 study (Ehrlich 1991) the turnaround time and
manpower were derived from comparisons with his-
torical aircraft systems maintenance records and ad-
justed to account for Shuttle support experience on
a subsystem by subsystem basis. From this informa-
tion the number of man-hours required to perform
corrective and preventive maintenance was derived
| Po_sitionGSE and _upport _ersonnel
1 week
HL-20::lands atl KSC SHuttle lar_dingfac!lity
Sniff check and offloadicrew an.d passehgers
Tow to.'sating area :
Dese_ice propellants @ndsafe::pyros
Pos tio'n ground support equipr_ent andl supportl personnel
Postflight idspectiorl
::TPS ma_intenanee
I Ca.bin dec_nfigura!ion : :
Air conditioning and prE=ssurerhaintenahce
Communications el_ectrical,land insti'umentslmaintedance
St)'uctural !nspectio_n and maintenahce
! Mechan_ical systems ma.intenance
• Engine, fuel syst@ms mai'.ntenance
I Equipmeht and fL#rnishin_;fSmaintenance
and cabin configuration i
II !Flight controls maintenance
I:: Miscell,4neous _ystems i'naintenance
::and se_icing
::_ Clqseout
I R_lout horizontal pr.ocessing facility
I Tmnsportito pad
IIiLift and::mate
li_tegrati0n testing
| HL-20 propellapt load
::_ Pyt.otechni@s installation
I Titan propellant load
ml, Launch count_lown
. I Laur_ch
Safing and
deservicing
0.5 day ___ Maintenance Integration |
processing ---_L_-- and launch __J
24.5 calendar days I 18 calendar days I
(16.5 workdays) I (14 workdays) /
Figure 3. HL-20 processing accomplished in 43 calendar days (31 work days, single-shift operation).
(no vehicle modifications were assumed). As a result,
the HL-20 was predicted to require 1486 man-hours
of support for the maintenance process. Hands-on
support was assumed to be accomplished by highly
skilled technicians with A&P (airframe and power-
plant) type training as used in the aircraft industry.
Although the technicians were highly cross-trained,
four skill classifications were assumed: avionics,
electrical, mechanical/systems, and thermal protec-
tion system (TPS). The tasks to support the vehicle
refurbishment processe s were determined and sched-
uled (fig. 3), then man-hour loaded by skill classifi-
cation. This resulted in a definition of 22 technicians
to support the process, including 3 to account for
nonproductive time, which includes vacations, holi-
days, sick leave , etc. These same technicians were as-
sumed available to support the sating and deservicing
process and the integration and launch process with-
out additional staffing. The hands-on staff consisted
of 3 avionics, 5 electrical, 3 TPS, and 11 mechani-
cal/systems technicians. This staff worked a single-
shift, 5-day week throughout the processing. Total
man-hour requirements for the turnaround ground
operations were 2362, including the 1486 man-hours
for the maintenance process, 772 for integration and
launch operations, and 104 for the landing, deservic-
ing, and sating operations.
A total of 162 personnel were estimated to sup-
port the ground operations. This includes the
22 technicians mentioned above plus the engineer-
ing, planning, quality, support, logistics, and ad-
ministrative departments. The Lockheed "Skunk
Works" estimates were somewhat lower for overall
personnel, 109, and higher for hands-on labor, 28.
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Figure 4. X-15 flights ordered by turnaround time.
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160 180 200
The lower ratio of support personnel to hands-on
staffing is based on Lockheed's contracted logistics
support experience.
In addition to the ground support operations,
Rockwell estimated a staff of 205 personnel were re-
quired to support mission operations. These flight-
specific functions consist of mission planning, simu-
lation, crew activity planning, and real-time support
for each flight of the HL-20. Mission support per-
sonne] that work generically on all flights and the
support staff are not accounted for here. Thus the
total supporting staff comparable to the 213 people
in the X-15 program would be 367 for the HL-20 dur-
ing mature operations.
Comparison and Discussion
Ideally one comparison between the support re-
quirements of the X-15 and HL-20 programs should
be in term_ of the maintenance burden for each ve-
hicle subsystem. The maintenance burden, as used
in this report, is the man-hours required for both
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance in support
of the typical turnaround operation. The mainte-
nance burden is a function of the design, the fail-
ure rate, the mission time, and the maintenance pol-
icy and can be used to define the average crew size
and/or processing time required for the turnaround
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operation. Unfortunately, this information was not
available for the X-15. However, by using the X-I5
flight histories, an estimate was derived of the over-
all X-15 maintenance man-hour burden comparable
to an HL-20 man-hour estimate. This was achieved
by using the previously presented ground support
crew size, as defined by Baker, with the time re-
quired for vehicle servicing and maintenance of fail-
ures. This maintenance/service time was estimated
from the total turnaround time for each flight based
on the flight histories in Miller (1983). (See appen-
dix for flight histories of the three aircraft.) The
turnaround times were plotted in order of increasing
times and are shown in figure 4. These turnaround
times include not only scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance, but also aircraft modifications, mission
aborts, mission delays, and schedule drivers. In an
attempt to capture only the required maintenance
burden that would be reflected by these turnaround
times, the13 longest were excluded from the analysis
along with the turnaround times for the initial flight
of each aircraft. These 13 flights were more likely to
have included some major modifications and repair
or extensive weather and schedule delays. (Based on
flights from Sept. 1961 to July 1965, the delays due
to weather, aircraft and experiment modifications,
and miscellaneous causes represent about 35 percent
of the delay times (Love and Young 1966).) There
E
!
i
!
appearsto bea clearchangein processingtimesat
about the 106-daypoint. It wasfelt that the re-
mainingprocessingtimes,representing92percentof
all flights,weremorerepresentativeof theprocessing
activities,eventhoughthesestill includesomeof the
moretypicaldelaysdueto weather,schedule,etc.
From the descriptiongivenof the X-15 turn-
aroundprocess,it appearsthat the equivalentof
1workdaywasusuallydevotedto theintegrationand
missionof theX-15.In anattemptto compareonly
the maintenancetimes,a daywassubtractedfrom
eachof theturnaroundtimes.A frequencydistribu-
tionwasthendevelopedbasedon7-daycentersandis
shownin figure5. Theresultsindicatethat themost
frequentlyexperiencedmaintenanceprocessingtime
requiredfortheX-15wasabout13calendardays,or
9 workdays.Thisshouldbe representativeof those
maintenanceprocessingsthatconsistprimarilyofthe
repairand checkoutoperations.Thelongertimes
shownin figure5 wouldbe morelikely to include
vehiclemodificationsandanydelaysdueto aborts,
weather,schedule,etc. This is consistentwith re-
sultsobserveduring1964and1965,whenonlyone
turnaroundin threewasaccomplishedwithout de-
laysor aborts(LoveandYoung1967).Themain-
tenanceburdencanthenbecomputedbasedonthc
derivedprocessingtime. Thus,the resultsshould
be representativeof the processingtime andmain-
tenancemanpowerequiredfor the X-15whenmin-
imalmodificationsor scheduledelaysoccurduring
turnaround.
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Maintenance processing time, calendar days
Figure 5. X-15 maintenance processing time histogram.
Using the 24 technicians (2 shifts of 12) over
this derived 9-workday period yields 1728 man-hours
available to satisfy the maintenance burden for the
X-15. Removing 12 percent of the man-hours that
typically are required for nonproductive time leaves
1520 productive man-hours. The maintenance bur-
den was then assumed equal to the productive man-
hours. By comparison, the maintenance burden for
the HL-20, as defined by Rockwell, is 1486 man-
hours (Ehrlich 1991). Based on the Rockwell-defined
staffing level, 2904 man-hours are available to achieve
the total HL-20 refurbishment operations over the
24.5 calendar days typically required (16.5 work-
days) during the turnaround process. The Lockheed-
defined burden for the maintenance is 1718 man-
hours (the specific time period for maintenance
operations was not defined). These findings are
summarized in table II.
Although the maintenance processing time esti-
mated for the HL-20.is greater than that experienced
by the X-15 and the man-hours required to satisfy
the maintenance burden less, these results probably
lie within the uncertalnt2 band associated with the
assumptions made in the derivation of these results.
The longer mission length for the HL-20 could be ex-
pected to generate higher maintenance requirements
than if it flew the shorter duration X-15 mission.
The additional time available for the HL-20 process-
ing provides a margin of 1486 additional man-hours
that can be applied should the actual maintenance
requirements exceed the predicted burden. Based on
the assumption of design comparability, the HL-20
support estimate would appear to be comparable to
that experienced by the X-15.
The integration and launch operations were ex-
cluded from this comparison. With the X-15 re-
quiring only 1 day for this process and the HL-20
requiring 14 workdays, clearly the integration and
launch process is driven by different requirements for
these two systems. For example, the HL-20 requires
a launch escape system that must be integrated with
the launch vehicle, whereas the X-15 did not.
Another method of comparison between the two
programs is based on the total available man-hours
to support the total turnaround process (sating, de-
servicing, maintenance, integration, and launch).
This involves using the typical X-15 processing times
that were achieved. Shorter turnaround times could
have been achieved (and frequently were), but the
schedule may not have required it. These compar-
isons are a function of the flight rate.
During 1965 and 1966, the X-15 fleet was flown
at a rate of over 30 flights per year (no flights from
Nov. 4, 1965 to May 6, 1966) representing an average
turnaround time of 36.5 calendar days (26 workdays)
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TableII. OperationsSupportRequirementsforX-15andHL-20
idarameter X-15 HL-20Rockwell HL-20Lockheed
Length,ft" 50 _ 29.5 29.5
2'2" 23.5 23.5Span,ft
Dryweight,lb 15000
33 300
Technology level
19 501 19170
Gross weight, lb 27915 25 486
Flight crew and passengers "i 10 8
Advanced Near term Near term
Mission types
Hands-on crew per turnaround
Skills
Maintenance hands'on man-hours
per maintenance processing
(burden/available)
Research
24
Electrical (1)
Mechanical (3)
Avionics (4)
Propellant/engine (2)
Crew chief (1)
Inspector (1)
1520/1728 (based on productive
man-hours/total man-hours,
13 workdays)
4992 (includes mission,
based on 26 workdays)
10 (based on 1 aircraft)
3
134 (supports 30 flights/yr)
Hands-on man-hours available
per turnaround (safe, maintain,
integrate, and launch)
Operational
22
Electrical (5)
Mechanical/systems (11)
Avionics (3)
TPS (3)
1486/2904 (based on
comparable aircraft
systems/16.5 workdays)
5456 (excludes mission,
based on 31 workdays)
8Flight rate per year
Operational
28
Avionics (9)
Systems (11)
NDE (3)
Inspector (5)
1718/N/A (based on
comparable Shuttle
systems/not defined)
6720 (excludes mission,
based on 30 workdays)
Fleet size
Support staff (includes hands-on) 162 109
Mission operations and analysis 79 205 (excludes all-flight and Not addressed
support nonflight support staff)
Launch vehicle support Excluded Excluded Excluded
for each aircraft (or a flight rate of 10 flights per year
for each aircraft). This represents 4992 man-hours
available from the hands-on support crew for each
mission.
By comparison, the Rockwell analysis predicts the
HL-20 will require a hands-on staff of 22 technicians,
working 1 shift, 5-day weeks, 43 calendar days
(31 workdays) to receive, safe, refurbish, integrate,
and prepare it for launch. This represents 5456 man-
hours per mission. This analysis was based on
8 flights per year. For the same flight rate, the Lock-
heed analysis resulted in 6720 man-hours based on
using 28 technicians over 42 calendar days to sup-
port the turnaround process. (This information was
presented at the HL-20 PLS Feasibility Assessment
Contractor Review, Dec. I0-11, 1991.) Their crew
makeup and size were dictated by skill requirements
and vary slightly from the hands-on crew require-
ments of the Rockwell study. For example, Lockheed
considers the NDE (nondestructive evaluation) tech-
nicians and inspectors to be a part of the hands-on
crew, whereas Rockwell considered these as support
functions. The X-15 program also used NDE person-
nel but in a support role. Because of the low flight
rate, the support man-hours are spread over a longer
period than the maintenance burden would require
to process the HL-20.
The similarities in subsystems, support staffs, and
overall processing times would imply a certain de-
gree of comparability between the support required
for the two vehicles. But, there are also a number
of differences that need to be noted. Technologies
used by the X-15 represented cutting-edge technolo-
gies at that time. They included Inconel skin, ti-
tanium structure, reaction control systems (RCS),
highly sophisticated throttleable rocket power, in-
tegrated control systems, and flight simulators us-
ing analog technology. In addition these technologies
were flown in altitude and speed regimes not previ-
ously explored. It might reasonably be expected that
the failure rates and repair times experienced with
these systems would be higher than in an operational
program where the technologies were more state of
the art. Technologies chosen for the HL-20 represent
existingand near-termtechnologies(ceramictiles,
ACC,blanketTPS,titaniumoraluminumstructure,
hydrogenperoxideRCS,GN&C,etc.). Themain-
tenanceconceptfor theX-15representeda support
environmentfor anexperimentalprogramthat in-
volveddevelopment,modifications,andflyingexper-
imentalsystems,whichalsohadto bemaintained.
TheHL-20is to havearepeatable,specificmissionto
perform,for whichthereshouldbenomodifications
or experimentalpackagesto complicatethemainte-
nancefunction.Therefore,amoreoperationalmain-
tenance nvironmentshouldbeapplicable.
Charles Baker and Jack Kolf of the X-15 pro-
gram have added some additional cautions to these
comparisons. Charles Baker indicated that a two-
shift operation may be required for the HL-20 in-
stead of the one shift proposed. This could create
two shifts whose total manpower requirements would
be slightly larger than those required for single-shift
operations in order to meet minimum skill require-
ments on each shift. Jack Kolf indicates that the
use of a thermal protection system in the HL-20
that is robust and easily penetrated for access to the
subsystems may represent the difference between be-
ing able to perform aircraft-like maintenance on the
HL-20 or requiring the much longer process times as-
sociated with the Space Shuttle.
It is interesting to note that based on the first
7 years of the X-15 flight experience, Love and Young
believed that the turnaround time for a similar type
of vehicle without the research role and associated
instrumentation might be as low as 15 days (Love
and Young 1967). This estimate would apply to a
prototype or an initial production model of a reusable
vehicle.
An additional consideration is the support envi-
ronment in which the HL-20 will operate. It will most
likely be different from that of the X-15 in the 1950's
and 1960's. The types of safety and environmental
rules that exist today were essentially nonexistent at
that time. For example, more stringent requirements
are placed on the handling and disposal of hazardous
materials today. Along with this comes new operat-
ing procedures and additional training requirements.
Work procedural changes mean additional oversight
in safety and quality assurance. These would cer-
tainly add to the support requirements if the X-15
program were repeated today.
Concluding Remarks
The X-15 program successfully demonstrated the
ability to support a reusable vehicle operating in a
near-space environment with a flight rate and sup-
port staff similar to that predicted for the HL-20.
Given an operating environment similar to that ex-
perienced by the X-15, subsystem comparability, and
a similar support environment, the HL-20 mainte:
nance and support crew complement should be able
to achieve the turnaround time predicted for the
HL-20. The HL-20 will, however, be operating in a
different environment than existed at Edwards AFB
during the 1950's and 1960's. Today's operating en-
vironment will likely impose additional requirements
on the HL-20 that will add to the maintenance and
support burden predicted by using the X-15 analogy.
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
April 22, 1993
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Appendix A
X-15 Turnaround Times
Table A1. X-15 'Ihirnaround Times (Miller 1983)
_igh,
no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
10
All aircraft:
(199 flights)
Date
No. 1 aircraft:
(81 flights)
Aircraft Flight
no. ! Days no. _ Date __ Days
6/8/59 1 1
9/17/59 2 ] 101 5
10/17/59 2 I 30 9
11/5/59 2 I 19 12
1/23/60 i I 79 13
2/11/60 2 I 19 14
2/17/60 2 6 15
3/17/60 2 I 29 16
3/25/60 1 8 18
3/29/60 2 4 19
3/31/60 2 2 20
4/13/60 1 l 13 21
4/19/60 1 6 22
5/6/60 1 I 17 23
5/12/60 1 6 24
5/19/60 1 7 25
5/26/60 2 7 27
8/4/60 1 I 70 29
8/12/60 1 8 31
6/8/59
1/23/60 229
3/25/60 62
4/13/60 19
4/19/60 6
5/6/60 17
5/12/60 6
5/19/60 7
8/4/60 77
8/12/60 8
8/19/60 7
9/10/60 22
9/23/60 13
10/20/60 27
10/28/60 8
11/4/60 7
No. 2 aircraft:
(53 flights)
Flight
no._ Date
11/17/60
11/30/60
12/9/60
Days
= : 9/17/59
:_ i 10/17/59 30
, 11/5/59 19
n , 2/11/60 98
" ' 2117160 6
^ _ 3/17/60 29
I0 ] 3/29/60 12
11 t 3/31/60 2
17 : 5/26/60 56
26 I 11/15/60 173
28 I 11/22/60 7
30 I 12/6/60 14
34 I 3/7/61 91
35 ] 3/30/61 23
36 I 4/21/61 22
37 I 5/25/61 34
13 38 [ 6/23/61 29
_13 ] 40 [ 9/12/61 81
9 ] 41 i 9/28/61 16
No. 3 mrcra_:
(65 flights)
Flight I
!
no. Date I Days
46 12/20/61 I
48 1/17/62 i 28
49 4/5/62 I 78
i
51 4/20/62 I 15
57 6/12/62 t 53
58 6121/62 l 9
62 7/17/62 t 26
65 812162 I 16
67 8/14/62 I 12
71 10/4/62 51
73 10/23/62 19
75 12/14/62 52
76 12/20/62 6
77 1/17/63 28
79 4/18163 91
81 5/2/63 14
82 5/14/63 12
84 5/29/63 15
85 6/18/63 20
8/19/60
9/10/60
9/23/60
10/20/60
10/28/60
11/4/60
11/i5/60
11/17/60
11/22/60
*11/30/60
12/6/60
12/9/60
2/1/61
2/7/61
3/7/61
3/30/61
1 7 32
1 I 22 33
1 I 13 39
1 I 27 42
1 8 44
1 7 47
2/1/61
2/7/61
8/10/61
10/4/61
10/17161
1/10/62
2 [ 11 50 " 4/19/62
1 2 52 t
2 5 54
1 8 56
2 6 59
1 3 61
1 I 54 64
1 6 78
2 I 28 80
2 t 23 83
4/30/62
5/22/62
6/7/62
6/27/62
7/16/62
7/26/62
4/11/63
4/25/63
5/15/63
4/21/61 1 2 1 22 86
5125161 ! 2 I 34 88 i
6/23/61 ! 2 t 29 89 !
8/10/61 _ 1 l 48 92
!
9/12/61 1 2 I 33 93
9/28/61 1 2 l 16 95 1
lO/4/61 i_ 1
6/25/63
7/9/63
7/18/63
10/7/63
10/29/63
11/14/63
6 97 12/5/63
54 43 1 10/11/61 13 87
6 45 1 11/9/61 29 90
184 53 t
55 55 [
13 60 l
85 63 ]
99 66 I
11 68 I
22 ] 69 I
16 i 70 I
20 i 72 I
19 74 I
10 109 I
259 114 I
14 118 I
20 121 I
41 127 J
14 131 ]
9 132 ]
81 137 !
22 139 I
16 141
21 146 !
.......... i
5/8/62 180 91
6/1/62 24 94
6/29/62 28 96
7/19/62 20 99
8/8/62 20 101
8/20/62 12 ! 102
8/29/62 9 i 106
9/28/62 30 ! 108
10/9/62 11 111
11/9/62 31 112
6/25/64 594 113
8/14/64 50 115
9/29/64 46 116
11/30/64 62 117
2/17/65 79 120
4/28165 70 122
5/18/65 20 124
6/22/65 35 125
7/8/65 16 126
813165 26 130
9/2/65 30 134
6/27/63 9
7/19/63 22
8/22/63 34
11/7/63 77
11/27/63 20
1/16/64 50
2/19/64 34
3/13/64 23
5/12/64 60
5/21/64 9
7/8/64 48
7/29/64 21
8/12/64 14 i
8/26/64 14
9/3/64 8 i
9/28/64 25
10/30/64 32
12/9/64 40
12/22/64 13
1/13/65 22
2/2/65 20
4/23/65 80
5/28/65 35
*Values corrected based on Hallion 1984.
TableA1.Continued
Flight
no.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
All aircra_:
(199 flights)
Aircraft
Date no. Days
10/11/61 2 7
10/17/61 I 6
Ii/9/61 2 23
12/20/61 3 41
1/10/62 1 21
1/17/62 3 7
4/5/62 3 78
4/19/62 1 14
4/20/62 3 k
4/30/62 1 i0,
5/8/62 2 8
5/22/62 1 14
6/i/62 2 10
6/7/62 1 6
6/12/62 3 5
6/21/62 3 9
6/27/62 1 6
6/29/62 2 2
7/16/62 1 17
7/17/62 3 1
7/19/62 2 2
7/26/62 1 7
8/2/62 3 7
8/8/62 2 6
8/14/62 3 6
8/20/62 2 6
8/29/62 2 9
9/28/62 2 30
10/4/62 3 6
10/9/62 2 5
10/23/62 3 14
11/9/62 2 17
12/14/62 3 35
12/20/62 3 6
1/17/63 3 28
4/11/63 1 84
4/18/63 3 7
4/25/63 1 7
5/2/63 3 7
5/14/63 3 12
5/15/63 1 1
5/29/63 3 14
6/18/63 3 20
6/25/63 1 7
6/27/63 3 2
7/9/63 1 12
Flight
no.
98
100
103
104
105
107
110
119
123
128
129
133
136
142
144
147
149
151
153
156
157
160
163
166
169
171
173
177
179
182
184
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
No. 1 aircraft:
(81 flights)
Date
1/8/64
1/28/64
3/27/64
418164
4/29/64
5/19/64
6/30/64
10/15/64
12/10/64
2/26/65
3/26/65
5/25/65
6/17/65
8/6/65
8/25/65
9/9/65
9/22/65
9/30/65
lO/14/65
11/4/65
5/6/66
7/12/66
7/28/66
8/11/66
8/25/66
9/8/66
10/6/66
3/22/67
4/28/67
6/15/67
6/29/67
3/1/68
4/4/68
4/26/68
6/12/68
7/16/68
8/21/68
9/13/68
10/24/68
Days
34
20
59
12
21
20
42
107
56
78
28
60
23
50
19
15
13
8
14
21
183
67
16
14
14
14
28
167
37
48
14
246
34
22
47
34
36
23
41
Flight
no.
155
158
159
162
164
167
170
175
180
186
188
No. 2 aircraft:
(53 flights)
Date
11/3/65
5/18/66
7/1/66
7/21/66
8/3/66
8/12/66
8/30/66
11/18/66
5/8/67
8/21/67
10/3/67
Days
62
196
44
20
13
9
18
80
171
105
43
Flight
no.
135
138
140
143
145
148
150
152
154
161
165
168
172
174
176
178
181
183
185
187
189
190
191
No. 3 aircraft:
(65 flights)
Date
6/16/65
6/29/65
7/20/65
8/10/65
8/26/65
9/14/65
9/28/65
10/12/65
10/27/65
7/18/66
8/4/66
8/19/66
9/14/66
11/1/66
11/29/66
4/26/67
5/17/67
6/22/67
7/20/67
8/25/67
10/4/67
10/17/67
11/15/67
Days
19
13
21
21
16
19
14
14
15
264
17
15
26
48
28
148
21
36
28
36
40
13
29
11
TableA1.Continued
All aircraft:
(199flights)
Flight Aircraft
no. Date no.
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
7/18/63
7/19/63
8/22/63
10/7/63
10/29/63
11/7/63
11/14/63
11/27/63
12/5/63
1/8/64
i/16/64
1/28/64
2/19/64
3/13/64
3/27/64
4/8/64
4/29/64
5/12/64
5/19/64
'5/21/64
6/25/64
6/3o/64
7/8/64
7/29/64
8112164
8/14/64
8/26/64
9/3/64
9/28/64
9/29/64
I0/15/64
10/30/64
11/30/64
12/9/64
12/10/64
12/22/64
1/13/65
2/2/65
2/17/65
2/26/65
3/26/65
4/23/65
4/28/65
5/_8/65
_/2_/65
1
3
3
I
1
33
1
3
1
1
3
1
3
3
1
1
1
3
Days
9
1
34
46
22
9
7
13
8
34
8
12
22
23
14
12
21
13
7
2
35
5
8
21
14
2
12
8
25
1
16
15
31
9
1
12
22
20
15
9
28
28
5
20
7
*Values corrected based on Hallion 1984.
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No. 1 aircraft:
(81 flights)
Flight
no. Date Days
No. 2 aircraft:
(53 flights)
Flight I
no. [ Date [ Days
No. 3 aircraft:
(65 flights)
Flight
no, Date Days
i
Table A1. Continued
All) aircraft:
(199 flights)
Flight
no. Days
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
Aircraft
Date no.
5/28/65 3
6/16/65 3
6/17/65 1
6/22/65 2
6/29/65 3
7/8/65 2
7/20/65 3
8/3/65 2
8/6/65 1
8110165 3
8/25/65 1
8/26/65 3
9/2/65 2
9/9/65 1
9/14/65 3
9/22/65 1
9/28/65 3
9/30/65 1
10/12/65 3
10/14/65 1
10/27/65 3
11/3/65 2
11/4/65 1
5/6/66 1
5/18/66 2
7/1/66 2
7/12/66 i
7/18/66 3
7/21/66 2
7/28/66 1
8/3/66 2
8/4/66 3
8/11/66 1
8/12/66 2
8/19/66 3
8/25/66 1
8/30/66 2
9/8/66 1
9/14/66 3
10/6/66 1
11/1/66 3
11/18/66 2
11/29/66 3
3/22/67 1
4/26/67 3
4/28/67 1
3
19
1
5
7
9
12
14
3
4
15
1
7
7
5
8
6
2
12
2
13
7
1
183
12
44
11
6
3
7
6
1
7
1
7
6
5
9
6
22
26
17
11
113
35
2
No. 1 aircraft:
(81 flights)
Flight
no. Date Days
No. 2 aircraft:
(53 flights)
Flight
no. Date Days
No. 3 aircraft:
(65 flights)
Flight
no. Date Days
13
TableA1.Concluded
i
All aircraft:
(199 flights)
Flight
no. Date
180 5/8/67
181 5/17/67
182 6/15/67
183 6/22/67
184 6/29/67
185 7/20/67
186 8/21/67
187 8/25/67
188 10/3/67
i89 10/4/67
190 10/17/67
191 11/15/67
192 3/1/68
193 4/4/68
194 4/26/68
195 6/12/68
196 7/16/68
197 8/21/68
198 9/13/68
199 10/24/68
Aircraft
no. Days
2 10
3 9
1 29
3 7
1 7
3 21
2 32
3 4
2 39
3 1
3 13
3 29
1 107
1 34
1 22
1 47
1 34
1 36
1 23
1 41
No. 1 aircraft:
(81 flights)
Flight
no I Datet Days
!
t
I I
No. 2 aircraft:
(53 flights)
Flight
no. Date I Days
No. 3 aircraft:
(65 flights) 1
F_ght Date Days[
i
i
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